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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE KNOWLEDGE
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
CARL COHEN*

I
There are a great many areas within the law in which the problem of
determining the responsibility of a defendant merges in a confused and
confusing way with extra-legal matters, and especially with fundamental
questions of ethics. No particular legal problem encounters this complication
more directly, or with greater need of clarification, than that of establishing
a proper standard for exculpation on grounds of mental disorder, or
insanity.
Insanity becomes an issue in the determination of criminal responsibility when, as in the common law, jurists explicitly recognize that guilt
involves, not only the comnission of the criminal deed (the actus rens),
but as well its accompaniment by some mens rea, or guilty mind. There
is no crime, say the judges, without criinal intent, or a state of mind,
willful, negligent or otherwise, equally assuring the culpable responsibility
of the accused. Of course the dcetermination of what constitutes criminal
intent is itself an enormous problem, not to be pursued here. All such
particular inquiries, however, go forward on the assumption of the
approximately normal healthy human character of the defendant. Whatever
criminal intent may be, it can only be present in one who is by accepted
standards a responsible agent, in control of his acts, and capable of directing
his behavior properly.
Hence the problem of insanity inevitably arises; for one who is insane
either cannot physically control his acts in the first instance, or, if in
physical control, cannot regulate them in accordance with accepted
standards of behavior - due to some compulsion to behave in certain
ways, or due to an inability to make sane judgments concerning the
character or consequences of his acts. The insane, in short, are not
responsible agents; and a criminal intent can only be found in persons
whose mental health is such that they are answerable for their behavior.
In other words, the defense of criminal non-responsibility by reason of
insanity is a specific instance of a more general legal proposition; that
no person can be held to answer at law, and be punished, for his illegal
deeds unless he has the capacity to entertain a criminal intent, to have
a "guilty mind."
This much, however, only raises the problem. For when, in practice,
the attempt is made to define, or characterize the insanity that would thus
excuse, the issues- legal, psychiatric and moral - become exceedingly
*A.B. 1951, University of Miami; M.A. 1952, University of Illinois; Ph.D. 1955,
University of California; Instructor in Philosophy, University of Michigan.
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complex. The growth of the law has seen the development of a good many
standards or tests for acquittal on grounds of insanity, the most recent
of these raising philosophical questions of the utmost interest. For if
the standards of criminal responsibility are based upon tacit principles
of ethics and moral epistemology which, if not unsound are so confused
as to wreak havoc in the application of the law, as is presently the case,
it is time to approach these problems from their foundations, and to
develop standards which are at once philosophically more sophisticated,
and more nearly in accord with the present state of human knowledge.
Before going on to examine the standards which have been and are
applied, it is perhaps well to note that the issues are not nearly so simple
as they may at first appear. It is not possible, for example, to resolve
the matter merely by reasoning as follows: "The problem of determining
mental health is one for experts in that field; let the psychiatrists decide
who is insane and who is not. Why confuse that factual question by
introducing philosophical issues which have no relevance?" Such an approach,
although attractive in its simplicity, is quite inadequate for two reasons:
First, although, to be sure, it is to mental medicine that we must go to
determine the mental health of the accused, the psychiatrist or psychologist - even assuming the exactitude of his science - is in a position only
to describe and categorize, and perhaps to treat the disease or condition
from which the patient suffers. But the courtroom is not a hospital; the
intricate classifications and complex characterizations of mental disorders
by the psychiatrist are constructed with concepts wholly inappropriate
for the use of juries consisting of laymen. This is not to say that a psychiatric
terminology is irrelevant to the problem of insanity as a defense-far
from that; but the contributions of mental medicine, to be utilized by
the law, must be put in fonus suitable for use within the juridical process,
and this is an objective not easily accomplished. Second, and more
important, even supposing that the concepts of psychopathology were
directly applicable in law, there is a more fundamental problem which
the study of mental disorders alone cannot resolve. That is to say, the
question of whether an individual is to be excused from guilt because
of mental condition is not one which can be answered with the most
detailed description of his condition. For there remains the basic problem on which the medical man qua medical man is no authority - what is to
justify non-responsibility? The question is one of justice, vaguely understood
and poorly formulated, to be sure, but at the root a problem in morals
none the less.
If the issue is not purely psychiatric, neither is it purely legal. Of course
the law, in its process, faces many moral questions -and goes on to
answer them with an impressive wisdom, surprising in the light of the
often confused terminology and conflicting opinions of juries and judges.
But a rough "sense of justice" is made concrete in legislation, and in the
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many principles of the common law. On this particular issue, however, the
rules of law are out of date and totally inadequate. For just as the
psychopathologist, working strictly within the realm of his science, cannot
resolve the moral problem of responsibility, so also the jurist, out of
substantive legal rules and procedures alone, cannot fashion satisfactory
standards of responsibility. It has been the failure of the law to recognize
the extra-legal facets of this question - therefore relying altogether too
heavily upon precedent and outworn legalisnis in this area - which has
resulted in a most unhappy situation. The present state of affairs is one
in which, to determine non-responsibility by reason of insanity, the law
relies upon obsolescent psychology, a confused use of ethical terms, and
the mistaken opinions of ancient and vencrable but ignorant judges for
the formulation of principles which are primitive in character and catastrophic in application.
In a word, the problem of developing appropriate standards for exculpation on grounds of insanity is not "purely" a question of anything. It is a
complex matter involving medical, legal, and ethical principles of
considerable sophistication.
II
The "tests" which have been applied to determine whether an accused
was truly insane, and therefore not responsible, have a weird and
fascinating history.' Upon the emergence of the common law from the
medieval period there are to be found only a set of vague generalizations
concerning "madmen" and "natural fools." The first important definition
to arise appears in the work of Bracton, in the 13th century: that a
madman is one who does not know what he is doing, who lacks in
2
mind and reason, and who is not far removed from the brutes.
Fitzherbert, a judge of common pleas in the sixteenth century, defined
an idiot as "such a person who cannot account or number twenty pence,
nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor how old he is, . . .",
Although Fitzherbert probably did not intend this to be the sole test of
idiocy, it came to be used as thb "counting twenty pence test" to determine
the responsibility of idiots and lunatics. In the eighteenth century, during
the trial of one Edward Arnold, the presiding justice held that the accused
must not be held responsible for his acts if he is a man that "is totally
deprived of his understanding and memory, and ...doth not know what
he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute or a wild beast. . .. 4
1. For a detailed account of the history of these legal tests see WIAITON & STILLE,
JURISPRUDENCE
(1st ed. 1855); GLEueK, MENTAL DIsORT)ER AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW chs. 5 & 6 (1925).
2. BRACTON, DE LEmBus ET CONSUETIDINIBUS ANGLIAE (c.1250). See WHARTON
& STILLE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 510; GLUECK, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 126.
3. See 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 2 (8th ed. 1824); GCrscK, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 128.
4. Rex v.Arnold, 16 flow. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724).
MEDICAL
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Thus arose what has been called the"wild beast" test of insanity. Another
eighteenth century presentation of the standard of insanity is that of
the commentator, William Hawkins, who argued that persons not punishable
by any criminal prosecution whatever are those "who are under a natural
disability of distinguishing between good and evil, as infants under the
age of discretion, ideots, and lunaticks. . . ."I Ilt is from this time onwards
that the knowledge of good and evil, or right and wrong, becomes the
central issue in the determination of criminal non-responsibility on mental
grounds. The subsequent history of English and American cases dealing
with the responsibility of the insane, though it discloses some variations
and refinements upon these "wild beast" and "good and evil" tests,
presents no significant change in the law until, in 1843, the entire problem
is reexamined in the case of Daniel McNaghten, 6
We are only concerned here to point out-what a careful analysis of
the history of this question would make abundantly clear-that the
ancient tests of responsibility have nothing to substantiate them but the
crude and ignorant opinions of earlier days. They are not the result of
mature and knowledgeable reflection; they are not the authoritative opinions
of an informed appellate tribunal; they are not even the result of the
careful use of judicial precedent. They are largely the product of efforts
on the part of the trail judges to reduce a complex matter to a simple rule.
'The formulation of these rules has come to be what it has because of
its development out of some primitive views of human psychology, and some
ethical assumptions which are at least doubtful. During most of this
period of scientific treatnent of mental disorders was practically unknown,
or was at least thoroughly mixed with, if not dominated by, superstitions
concerning witches and devils. The result has been that the traditional
authorities have repeated, almost verbatim, each other's words and phrases.
In short, there is nothing really very authoritative in these tests, nothing
very consistent in them; there are no very good reasons why they should
not be changed - and numerous good reasons why they should. Yet
with very few exceptions, these ancient comments and decisions constitute
not only the foundation, but much of the substance of present day
English and American law on the subject of insanity as a defense. What
efforts have been made to bring it up to date have largely been exerted
within this same intellectual framework.

5. 1 HAWKINS, oD. cit. suora note 3, at 1.
6. McNaghten's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Other accepted
spellings of the case style are M'Naghten, or McNaughten. For other early English cases
dealing with the insanity problem see: Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car, and P. 525 (1841);
Offord's Case, 2 Car. and P. 168 (1831); Hladfield's Case, 27 Hfow. St. Tr. 1283
(1800); Earl Ferrer's Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760). See also Bellingham's Case
in 1 COLLINSON ON LuNAcY 671 (1812). For coment on these early cases see GLUeCK,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 142. For early cases on the same problem in this cotuntry see:
In re Bell, City Hall Recorder N.Y. 85 (1817); In re Clark, I City Hall Recorder N.Y.
176 (1816).
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III
The crudeness, vagueness, and general inadequacy of these tests for
insanity made it necessary for some more consistent and authoritative
statement of the law to be given. The actual occasion for this statement came
with the famous- or infamous - McNaghten's Case, in 1843, after which
the insanity rule of current iuridical application is named.7 This McNaghten
rule - called also the "right and wrong" test for insanity - is today the
law in most American jurisdictions; we therefore propose to examine it
minutely. The injustice which results from teiapplication of this rule
presents a pressing need for remedy; yet nowhere is there a clear and
comprehensive statement of the many different grounds upon which it is
properly to be criticized. Itis tinie that the McNaghtcn Rule be scrapped,
and it is our chief purpose to explain, very clearly, why this is so.
First, the facts of the case. Daniel McNaghten was suffering from a
severe Case of what would be called today paranoia; in him the condition
was manifested in an elaborate system of delusions of persecution. Believing
that the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, was "out to get him," he shot
and killed Peel's private secretary, Edward Drummond, whom lie believed
to be Peel. When brought to trial, medical evidence was submitted to
the following effect: that McNaghten was suffering from morbid delusions,
such that lie was "carried away, beyond the power of his own control";
that he no "moral perception of right and wrong"; that his condition
could "burst forth with irresistible intensity," at which time he might
suffer "the most extravagant and violent paroxysms." 8 rle judge's charge
to the jury contained the following statement:
The question to be determined is, whether at the time the act in
question was committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of
his understanding, so as to know that he was doing a wrong or
wicked act. If the jurors should be of the opinion that the
prisoner was not sensible, at the time he committed it, that he
was violating the laws both of God and man, then he would be
entitled to a verdict in his favor.9
The verdict was "Not guilty, on the ground of insanity." The acquittal
of the accused, and the prestige of his victim, combined to bring the
McNaghten case to public attention- particularly in the House of Lords,
where it caused a furor. After lengthy debate, the Lords, exercising their
prerogative, drew up certain questions concerning the law of insanity,
which were put to the judges of England, in order to obtain from them
a clear and distinct rule, laid down by their united authority, with which
to guide the future administration of justice. From that day to this it
has been the general practice of judges, in charging juries, in cases
7. McNaghten's Case, supra note 6.
8. Id. at 201-02, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
9. Id. at 202, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719-720.
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involving the question of insanity, to use the very words of the answers
which were given by the English judges on that occasion.10
Because these opinions are of such enormous importance, and because
we intend a lengthy criticism of the rule which was abstracted from
them, we include here, verbatim, four of the five questions, and the answers
which the judges gave to them."
Question 1. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed
by persons afflicted with insane delusion, in respect of one or
more particular subjects or persons: as, for instance, where at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew
he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of
with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing
or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some
supposed public benefit?
Answer to Question 1. Assuming that your Lordship's inquiries
are confined to those persons who labor under such partial delusions
only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of the opinion
that, notwithstanding the party accused did the act complained
of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of
redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of
producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable
according to the nature of the act committed, if he knew at the
time of committing such crime that lie was acting contrary to
law; by which expression we understand your Lordships to mean
the law of the land.
Question 2. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the
jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion
respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged
with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and
insanity is set up as a defence?
Question 3. In what tenns ought the question to be left to the
jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act
was committed?
Answer to Questions 2 and 3. As these two questions appear to
us to be more conveniently answered together, we have to submit
our opinion to be, that the jurors ought to be told in all cases
that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crime, until the contrary
be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence
on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or,
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to
the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the
10. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw Or ENCLAND, 153 (1883).
11. McNaghten's Case, 10 C1. and Fin. 200, 203, 209, 8 Eng. Rep. 720, 722 (1843).
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accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between
right and wrong: which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading
to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate
when put generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference
to the party's knowledge of right and wrong ii respect to the very
act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as
to the knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively with
reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the
ury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the
aw of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction;
whereas the law is administered on the principle that every one
must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he
does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was one
which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time
contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual
course therefore has been to leave tbe question to the jury,
whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason
to know he was doing an act that was wrong: and this course
we think is correct, accompanied with such observations and
explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may
require.
Question 4. If a person under insane delusion as to existing
facts, commits an offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby
excused?
Answer to Question 4. The answer must of course depend on
the nature of the delusion: but, making the same assumption as
we did before, namely, that he labours undar such partial
delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he
must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility
as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real,
For example, if under the influence of his delusion he supposes
another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life,
and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would
be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased
had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune and lie
killed him in revenge
1 2 for such supposed injury, he would be
liable to punishment.
From these famous opinions has come the standard upon which
criminal responsibility is assigned today. Nearly all states, and almost all
12. The fifth question, with which we shall not be directly concerned, is whether
a medical man who had not seen the accused prior to the trial, could be asked his
opinions as to the state of the defendant's mind at the time of the alleged crime. The
answer was that he could not be asked, since the answer would depend upon the
determination of the truth of facts, which are for the jury to decide. Where the facts
are admitted or not disputed, the question is "of science only" and may be put.
Although at first plausible, this opinion has the peculiar consequence that, while
medical opinion concerning the prior state of the subject's physical health is admissible,
(as, for example, the state of his health at the date an insurance policy was effected),
medical opinion on the prior state of the subject's mental health is not admissible.
What seems to underlie this ruling is the unwarranted and mistaken assumption that
while physical disorders admit of professional diagnosis, mental disorders do not. Too
frequently the further assumption

is made that the latter type of case requires no

scientific diagnosis, and can be detected by any layman.
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other American jurisdictions apply the test of "knowledge of the difference
between right and wrong" to determine whether the accused was insane,
and therefore not responsible for his conduct. This standard, whose classic
statement appears in the answer to the second and third questions above,
is called the McNaghten rule:
. . . to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing, of if he did know it that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong

.

.

. the question has generally been,

whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the
difference between right and wrong. 13 (Emphasis added.)
This "right and wrong" test for responsibility has been supplemented, in
some jurisdictions, by other additional standards, such as that of "irresistible impulse," to which we will return later; but in only two jurisdictions
14
has the McNaghten rule been deliberately and consciously discarded.
Ironically, the most recent and most rigorous opinion rejecting the
McNaghten rule has itself been rejected in turn by almost every court
in which it has been considered.' Yet the Durham opinion is only one
of the many criticisms of the McNaghten rule which have been registered,
over the years, from one viewpoint or another. It is our specific intention
to show that from every relevant point of view -psychological, legal,
and philosophical - the McNaghten rule is crude, inadequate, mistaken
and unjust; that it is unsatisfactory in practice, and in theory unsound.
IV
We turn first to the criticisms of the right and wrong test based
upon psychological or psychiatric considerations. For it must be kept in
mind that mental disorders are diseases (or defects of peculiar kinds)
and action to be taken because these conditions exist should be consistent
with the best opinion concerning the nature of these conditions. If the
mental capacities of the accused in a criminal case are in question, the
extent to which tley are disordered, and the relations of these disorders
to general mental competence constitute the factual base upon which the
decision as to the responsibility of the accused must be made. This, in
turn, means that the following two kinds of mistakes must be avoided:
13. McNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
14. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); State v. Pike,
49 N.H. (1 Shirley) 399 (1870).
15. The Durham opinion has been rejected by the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals; The United States Court of Military Appeals; and by the highest court
of six states. See Anderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); Howard v.
United States, 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir, 1954); United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A.
346 (1954); People v. Ryan, 295 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1956); Flowers v. State, 139 N.E.
2d 185 (Ind. 1956); Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955); State v.
Kitchens, 286 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 1955); State v. Goyet, 132 A.2d 623 (Vt. 1957);
State v. Collins, 314 P.2d 660 (Wash. 1957).
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1. We must not, in reaching our decision, confuse symptoms with
diseases, thereby determining sanity and responsibility, or insanity and
non-responsibility, conclusively because of the absence or presence of
certain particular symptoms.
2. We must not, in our attempt to understand the defendant's mental
condition, put questions to the psychopathologist in terms which make it
impossible for him to answer, or to answer with accuracy.
Both of these principles are done violence by the application of the
MeNaghten rule. In what follows we shall make explicit the criticisms
upon which this general contention is founded. Comments in group A
concern the law on delusion; those in group B concern the use of the
knowledge of right and wrong in the determination of legal responsibility.
A 1. It should first be pointed out that the McNaghten opinions
are very largely concerned with the criminal responsibility of persons
suffering from insane delusions. This was the case of McNaghtei himself,
and was the question of interest in the ensuing debates. 8 The result
has been that delusions have comc to be viewed as the sole, or at least
the outstanding manifestation of mental disorders. Now, while delusions
are a common result of some kinds of mental disorder, they are by no
means a result of all such disorders. Therefore opinion concerning the
effects of insane delusions upon criminal responsibility make a totally
inadequate source for a general rule to test the defense of insanity. The
answers to the first and fourth questions, clearly, have no applicability
to insanity in general, but only to conditions involving delusion. As for
the second and third answers, most courts have acted as though they
do refer to insanity in general. But that does not really seem to have
been the intention of the judges who formulated the answers; for they
replied to questions two and three together, and question two is specifically restricted to the cases of persons "alleged to be afflicted with
insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons."'7
Yet the practice of the courts has come to be to apply the answer to the
second and third questions to all cases of insanity, including types that
have nothing to do with delusion. 8
A 2. It is virtually impossible to say that persons suffering from
insane delusions are only partially insane. The McNaghten opinions suffer
from the assumption that it is correct to talk about "partial delusion";
that one can be laboring under the delusion that he is being hunted
down, and yet not be "in other respects insane." That conditions of
mental disorder vary greatly, in degree as well as kind, there is no doubt
whatever; but the isolation of particular delusions, and the identification
of these with the disease, is indefensible from a psychiatric point of view.
16. See part III of text supra.
17. McNaghten's Case, 10 C1. and Fin. 200, 203, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 720 (1843).
18. See Barnes, A Century of the McNaghten Rules, 8 CANte. L.J. 303 (1944).
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That the McNaghten opinions make the assumption of the plausibility of
partial delusion or partial insanity is explained, in part, by the great
popularity, at that time, of the study of phrenology, and the theories of
Dr. F. J. Gall, developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Although phrenology, as a science, was soon to be abandoned,
Gall has been described as the founder of criminal anthropology. His
leading hypothesis was that the brain consists of many organs, each of
which is associated with a particular faculty of the human mind. Each
of these organs, and consequently the dependent faculty, was supposed
capable of deterioration without general brain deterioration. 1 On such
a view, partial insanity might make sense.
Phrenology has long since been discarded; but the notion of partial
insanity which was its corollary lingers on in the law, in spite of the fact
that recent medical opinion would reject it completely. One authority
writes, "There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours
under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane." 20 Elsewhere
it is held that, "The theory of partial or limited insanity is untenable;
2
the mind functions as a whole and is disturbed as a whole." '
A 3. Supposing that "partial delusion" was the defendant's condition,
the opinions go on to make the further psychological blunder of assuming
that he would be in a position to reason about his delusions in a normal
manner. One suffering from the delusion that he is being unjustly
tormented and persecuted is expected to decide in a rational manner
whether acts committed as result of this delusion would be contrary to
law if the facts believed were true! Of course the accused may have been
able so to reason; but the assumption that he must have been displays
a crude and woefully inadequate appreciation of the disordered mind.
Persons suffering from delusions of persecution, say as a result of advanced
paranoia, are frequently not able to reason about them. The delusions are
themselves the effects of a disordered mind -a
mind over which the
subject has little or no control. When we expect a psychotic to reason
about his psychosis we are treating him as though he were an ordinarily
sane person, simply mistaken as to the facts of a given situation. Surely
we cannot expect him to reason about his delusive mistake as a healthy
person does in the case of factual mistake; yet this is exactly what is
presupposed in the answers to the questions raised in the McNaghten case.
A 4. This leads to a more fundamental criticism of these opinions.
The answers given make the general mistake of confusing the symptom
with the disease. Delusions of persecution, and such, are only indications
of mental disorders; from them we can go on to learn the extent and
character of the disorder, and the ways in which all of the normal mental
19. For a complete account of Gall's phrenological theories see EAST, MEDICAL
ASPECTS OF CRIME (1936).
20. EAST, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 58 (1927). See also TAYLOR,
PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE ch. 18 (10th ed. 1948).
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processes have been disturbed. The psychotic is not sick because he has
delusions; he has delusions because he is sick. It is this inversion of
cause and effect which led the judges to assume that all those mental
processes exclusive of delusive beliefs were in normal condition - and
that therefore the deluded defendant could be held responsible if,
supposing the delusive opinions to be true, the act were still a crime. But
when delusions are properly understood, as symptoms of a larger and
far more complex condition, this type of argument must be abandoned.
A 5. Properly conceived, as symptomatic, the interpretation of delusions
as though they were just mistakes of fact is out of the question - because
strange, and apparently insignificant delusions may be indicative of the
most serious mental disorders. Therefore, the fact that the delusive belief
seems to have little bearing upon the act, and that the delusive belief
if true would not excuse the act, certainly should not establish the sanity
of the accused. It is not the particular delusion which may excuse from
criminal responsibility, but the psychopathological condition for which
that delusion provides evidence. One critic of the McNaghten opinions
gives the following example:
A man commits what on the face of it is a cruel and treacherous
murder. It is proved that lie labored under an insane delusion that
his little finger was made of glass. In itself such a delusion has no
sort of tendency to excuse such a crime, and has no apparent
connection with it, but if physicians of experience were to say
that a fixed delusion on such a subject could arise only from deepseated disease affecting a man's whole view of the world in which
he lived, falsifying his senses, rendering him inaccessible to reasoning of the simplest kind, and incapacitating him from performing
the commonest and most conclusive experiments, I do not see
why they should not be believed.22
It is these several failures to appreciate the true and complex relations
existing between delusions and mental disorders in general which render
the reasoning upon these matters in the McNaghten opinions now
unsound. So much for that portion of the judges' opinions which concern
the bearing of insane delusions upon criminal responsibility.
B 1.To the right and wrong test, enunciated in the answer to the
second and third questions, 23 the psychological and psychiatric objections
are similar, but stronger yet. Here, even more than in the former case,
the test is based upon the presence or absence of one particular elementthe knowledge of the difference between right and wrong. The presence
of this element alone becomes, on this test, both the necessary and
sufficient condition of sanity and therefore of responsibility. But from a
medical point of view, the many objections which can be raised to this
test are all special cases of this general principle: that mental disorder is
21. British Medical Journal, Feb. 16, 1924.
22. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF TIE CRIMINAL LAw Or ENCLAND 157 (1883).
23. McNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (1843).
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not so clear, so simple, or so well understood, that any single elementto say nothing of the knowledge of the difference between right and
wrong- could be its sole determinant.
Of course it may be argued in reply that the tests of responsibility
are simply that and no more, that they do not pretend to face the
complexities of psychopathology, that their application involves no claims
concerning the defendent's health -j ust whether he is to be held
accountable for his act and punished. This is a sensible distinction to
make, for mental disorder is one concept, legal responsibility another;
the presence of the one does not necessarily excuse from the other. But
this separation of the legal and the psychological must not be carried
too far. For the tests of legal responsibility have arisen and developed
with a growing consciousness that the strict application of penalties must
be tempered by a recognition of the capacities of the offender. It is
with this as a goal that the legal rules have grown from their first crudity
and generality. Though still crude and general, they have reached a point
at which specific features of the situation are attended to: the delusive
character of the actor's beliefs, his knowledge at the time, etc. Now the
contributions which medical science may make to the continued development of these rules do not, by themselves, solve the juridical problem;
but neither can the just solution to that problem ignore them. In the
light of what medical knowledge we can obtain, we want to ask: does the
McNaghten insanity rule provide the best standard for determining the
mental disorder which ought to excuse one from criminal responsibility?
Does its application select those cases and only those cases in which we
would want to say that, because of his mental condition, the accused
really should not be held accountable for his acts? From this psychological
and psychiatric point of view, the rule is open to the most serious
criticisms.
B 2. The standard of knowledge of the difference between right and
wrong encounters enormous obstacles in application, simply because of the
uncertainty of its meaning, about which more shall be said later. Whatever
its meaning, however, it is an extremely awkward standard because its
use requires an answer to a question of the following kind: Did the
accused know some certain thing? But it is extremely difficult to estimate
the knowledge of one who is mentally ill; for even supposing we understand
the intended sense of "knowledge," the answer depends upon the degree
to which the general mental deterioration has progressed in the particular
case in question. And even where the condition has been thoroughly and
accurately diagnosed, one cannot certainly know what knowledge capacity
remains in that instance, since the effects of many specifiable conditions
upon the capacities of the patient vary in kind and in degree. It is
therefore sometimes possible to make generalizations concerning the
individual's capacities, without being able to answer a specific question
as to the state of his knowledge.
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B 3. As a rule for the determination of insanity the right and wrong
test faces the same serious objection encountered in the discussion of
delusions: that, however it is understood, absence of knowledge of the
difference between right and wrong can only be a symptom of mental
disorder, and as such not the factor which should determine the responsibility of the accused. Again the confusion of the manifestation of a
mental condition with the condition itself leads- to an undue emphasis
upon this or that feature of the situation, which may lead in turn to
an unjust disposition of the case.
B 4. That the use of this rule may in fact result in injustice becomes
clear when one considers how well the right and wrong test applies to
known cases of serious mental disorders. For there are at least some kinds
of mental disease whose effects upon persons are very serious, and surely
should abrogate their criminal responsibility, and yet which will not meet
the requirements for insanity presented in the courts. The result is
pathetic. Instances in point are the relatively recent trials of Albert Fish,
in New York, and William Hcirens in Illinois. 24 In these cases of child
dismembermcnt, and attendant horrors, the defendants, suffering from
the most serious of mental conditions, were convicted, and executed or
imprisoned for life. They passed the legal test for sanity by knowing
the difference between right and wrong, and hence were held criminally
responsible for their acts. I-low many cases of this sort go without recognition or notice is impossible to determine.
The point is that some mental disorders do not result in a breakdown
of the subject's knowledge capacities, to whatever extent those capacities
can be isolated. \Vhen the prosecution, therefore, presents the question:
"Did the defendant, at the time of his act, know the difference between
right and wrong?" the examining psychiatrist in forced either to give an
indeterminate reply, or to answer affirmatively. In cases of epilepsy, for
example, increased irritability and infantile reactions to environment may
result in criminal acts, where the cause is clearly mental disorder, but
the knowledge of the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of the act is yet
present. Mental deterioration caused by violent and convulsive epileptic
attacks may express itself in the severe disturbance of the emotional life
of the patient, and not in the lack of knowledge. In some cases of schizophrenia the patient, having committed some criminal act, behaves and
appears as though he knows very well the difference between right and
wrong. Cases of paranoia present pcrhaps the clearest indication of the
crudeness of the McNaghfen rule. Victims of this condition, exhibiting
symptoms of fixed suspicions, persecutory delusions, delusions of grandeur,
etc., may yet maintain formally correct behavior for the most part, and
a clear, coherent train of thought. Since the system of delusions need not
24. For an account of the background, psychiatric examinations, and convictions of
these and other insane offenders see COHEN, MURDER, MADNESS AND TILE LAw
(1952).
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interefere with the orderly and intellectual direction of conduct, one is forced
to conclude that some seriously ill paranoids do know the difference
between right and wrong. Nor are these cases adequately covered by the
delusion tests which stein from the McNaghten case, for their frequent
inapplicability has already been discussed?5 Ironically, the occurrence of
paranoia in persons accused of homicide is not rare- a correlation which
increases the need for a re-evaluation of the legal standards of the responsibility of the insane.
B 5. The emphasis upon knowledge as the test of responsibility is
indicative of what is perhaps the underlying misconception of the
McNaghten rule -that the cognitive capacities can be singled out, among
mental phenomena, as the proper determinants of sanity and responsibility.
Although we do, for purposes of analysis, distinguish the cognitive, conative,
and affective aspects of mental life, it is an error to assume, as the
MeNaghten rule does, that these aspects of experience can be separated
to the extent that one alone - the cognitive - is the index of mental
health. The actual mental experience of persons, well or sick, cannot be
brokcn up so neatly into its constituents. We can no longer assume that
reason, or cognition, is the only-or even the prime-regulator of
conduct. That the human personality is an integrated unity, in the
direction of which all of the modes of experience play some part is now
a commonplace. The point is that people may be brought, by insane
emotion or compulsion, to do what they themselves know to be wrong3 0
Yet that faculty psychology already discussed, so prevalent in the nineteenth century, has colored, through the McNaghten opinions, the legal
standards of the present day.
B 6. On grounds such as these, the right and wrong test of responsibility has been forcefully and repeatedly condemned by criminologists and
psychiatrists. 2 7 These attitudes are well summarized by the Report of the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment:
The McNaghten test is based on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity does
not only, or primarily affect the cognitive or intellectual faculties,
but affects the whole personality of the patient, including both
the will and the emnotions. An insane person may therefore often
know the nature and quality of his act and that it is wrong and
forbidden by law, but yet commit it as a result of the mental
disease. . . . It is well established that there are offenders who
25. See part IV, Al-A5 of text supra.
26. See MENNINCER, LIE IIUMAN MIND 450 (1937).
27. GUTTMACHER AND WEIIO'EN, PSYCIIIATRY AND
MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 449-50 (1937); ZILnooRC,
246-97

(1943);

GROUP

FOR

TIE LAW 406-08 (1952);
MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN

REPORT BY TIE COMMITTEE ON FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY OF TlEl1'
THE ADVANCEMINT OF PSYCHIATRY (1953);
REPORT Of TIlE ROYAL

COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISIIMENT

103 (Sept. 1953); Glueck, Psychiatry and the

Criminal Law, 14 VA. L. Rtv. 155, 161 (1928); Karpman, Criteria for Knowing Right
from Wrong, J. or CRIM. PSYcIlOPATIIOLocY 376, 379 (1941).
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know what they are doing and know that it is wrong .

. but

are nevertheless so gravely affected by mental disease that they
ought not to be held responsible for their actions.2

(Emphasis

added.)
V
From the standpoint of the law, and the juridical process, the right
and wrong test of criminal responsibility meets objections different in
kind but at least as powerful as those arising out of the growth of psychological and psychiatric knowledge. The general conclusion to which these
legal* criticisms point is that the McNaghten rule and its variants, do
not meet the minimal requirements for clear, consistent, and authoritative
standards, applicable with reasonable stability and justice.
1. Prior to the McNaghten case, the law on insanity had developed
from the opinions of various single trial judges, none of whom had
specifically intended for their principles a generality exceeding reference
to the case then at issue. The uncertain value and authority of these
tests for responsibility was one of the chief reasons the House of Lords
put their questions to the judges of England in the McNaghten case.
Yet, the authoritativeness of the opinions of these judges is itself open to

question. Stephen, in his History of the Criminal Law of England, attacks
the authority of these opinions on two grounds:29
a. The answers given by the judges do not form a judgment upon
definite facts proved by evidence. The point is that answers to hypothetical
questions arc of dubious value in establishing legal rules, and that answers,
to have been most cffcctive and authoritative, should have been given
in the form of a specific judgment, and upon facts actually proved in
the case.
b. More important is the fact that since the questions were put in
such general terms, and since the answers follow the wording of the
questions so closely, it is doubtful if these answers can be rightly applied
to circumstances in any way different from those described in the
questions. Stephen argues that these opinions "leave untouched every
state of facts which, though included under the gencral words of the
questions, can nevertheless be distinguished from them by circumstances
which the I-louse of Lords did not take into account in framing the
questions." 30 So, the argument continues, even if the authority of the
judges be allowed in this case, any case in which the symptoms differed
from those of the delusional system described in the question, would
not be bound by these opinions. Its subsequent extension has then been
unwarranted.
28. REPORT
(Sept. 1953).
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29. 2 STFPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 152 (1883).

30. Id. at 154.

80, 103
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But, although the authoritativeness of the McNaghten rule may thus
be called into question, this is a theoretical objection only, since, whatever
should have been its application, it has been accepted and acted upon
ever since. The right and wrong rule has become the most important
element in the English and American law of insanity.
2. If the knowledge of the difference between right and wrong as the
test of responsibility is strictly and narrowly construed, as it frequently
has been,3' it would follow that any effects of insanity upon the conative
or affective life of the accused could not be taken into account in deciding
whether he is to be held criminally responsible for his act. Now if, as
Stephen points out,3 2 these effects of insanity can never, under any
circumstances, affect the criminality of acts by insane persons, the consequences would be "monstrous." If such consequences were intended, one
would suppose that more than the implication of such narrow construction
would be called for; that is, the more absence of any other principles
is not an adequate support of the exclusive applicability of the right and
wrong test.
3. Some general awareness of the "monstrous consequences" of the
use of the right and wrong test alone is manifested in the development
of the "irresistible impulse" test for criminal responsibility in some
jurisdictions. The injustice which results from the exclusive use of the
McNaghten Rule has caused some judges to argue that a defendant, even
if lie knew his act was wrong, may not be responsible if, because of his
insanity, he had not the power to resist doing it.33 The development
of this "irresistible impulse" test, though it is indicative of the inadequacy
of knowledge as a sole criterion of responsibility, is itself an unsatisfactory
supplement to the MeNaghten rule. This for several reasons:
a. It is very difficult to prove that an act is the result of an "irresistible
impulse." It may be no less difficult to prove the knowledge of right and
wrong on the part of the accused, but that is not the point; judges who
feel obliged to accept the authority of the McNaghten Rule are loathe
to introduce additional tests whose meaning in practice is equally difficult
to determine. The disagreements of experts, the difficulty of distinguishing
31.See, e.g., the Appeal of Ronald True, 16 Crim. App. R. 164, 169 (Eng. 1922)
where it was said that the "old rigour of the rule in McNaghten's Case' had not been
relaxed and that these old tests were still in force, and did not include the "irresistible
impulse" principle.
32. 2 STEPHEN, oh. cit. supra note 29, at 159.
33. See, e.g., William v. State, 50 Ark. 511, 518 (1888). In order for insanity to
excuse "itmust appear he was so affected by it as to be unable to distinguish between
right and wrong . . . or if he was conscious of the act he was doing and knew its
consequences, that he was, in consequence of his insanity, wrought up to a frenzy,
which rendered him unable to control his actions or direct his movements." Morgan v.
State, 130 N.E. 528, 530 (Ind. 1921): "A person may have sufficient mental capacity
to know right from wrong, and to be able to comprehend the nature and consequences
of the act, and yet not be criminally responsible for his action, for if the will power
is so impaired that he cannot resist an impulse to commit a criminal act he is not of
sound mind."
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between impulses genuinely irresistible to the diseased mind and mere
outbursts of auger, the fear that using such test will excuse the commission
of most criminal acts - all combine to make irresistible impulse very difficult
to establish, and the associated test of responsibility of dubious value.
b. Some have argued that the irresistible impulse test is nonsense
because there is no such thing as an impulse which is irresistible - that
the impulses of the mentally sick arc not irresistible, but merely unresisted.
The classical statement of this position, by an English jurist, runs as
follows:
But if an influence be so powerful as to be termed irresistible,
so much the more reason is there why we should not withdraw
any of the safeguards tending to counteract it. There are three
powerful restraints existing, all tending to the assistance of the
person who is suffering under such an influence: the restraint
of rcligion, the restraint of conscience, and the restraint of law.
But if the influence itself be held a legal excuse, rendering the
crime dispunishable, you at once withdraw a most powerful
4
restraint-that forbidding and punishing its perpetration.
In another English case, when asked by counsel for the defendant whether
he understood what was meant by kleptomania, the judge is reported
to have replied: "Oh yes, and I am here to cure it.'15 And again there
is the famous question asked when the claim is made that an act was the
result of irresistible impulse: "Would the prisoner have committed the
act if there had been a policeman at his elbow?" Of course such arguments
may be said to beg the question insofar as they assume that these impulses
are not irresistible, but simply not resisted strongly enough. On the
other hand, since this is the point at issue, one cannot establish the fact
that they are irresistible simply by calling them that. And the question
of whether sonic such impulses could be resisted is moot.
c. For reasons such as these, most jurisdictions have refused to apply
the irresistible impulse test of responsibility. But perhaps the strongest
objection to this test lies not in the reasons which cause it to be rejected,
but in its inadequacy as a supplement to the McNaghten rile, even when
it is accepted. For the acts which occur as the result of "irresistible impulse"
(as generally understood) are neither all nor only those acts of insane and
therefore non-rcsponsible persons not covered by the McNaghten rule.
The behavior of sonic persons by no means insane may sometimes be the
result of irresistible impulse, and to that extent the requirement is too
strong for its purpose. In other cases, victims of mental disease, knowing
the difference between right and wrong in the required sense, may cooly
and intellectually plan an act which also cannot be construed as the
result of irresistible impulse

-

an act which is none the less the product

34. Regina v. laynes, 1 F. & F. 666 (1859) (Branwell B.).
35. Cited in 55 L.I. 121 (1890); GLurCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 265.
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of violent mental disorder. To this extent the requirement of irresistible
impulse is too weak for its purpose. The point, in short, is that the
irresistible impulse test for responsibility- in that its use is a recognition
of the inadequacy of the exclusive use of the knowledge test-is a move
in the right direction, but is yet a principle of insufficient generality or
precision to cope with the complex character of insane behavior.
as
In a like manner, other makeshift tests for responsibility -such
that of comparing the mentality of the accused to that of a child of
fourteen " etc.,- introduced to supplement the McNaghten rule, tend
to be crude, haphazard, and inadequate to deal with the subtleties of the
problems which arise.
4. So we are thrown back upon the McNaghten rule, which is the
only rule applicable to alleged cases of insanity in most jurisdictions. 37
And this unreasonable emphasis upon the purely cognitive faculties for
the determination of responsibility brings us to the most crushing legal
objection to the right and wrong test: namely, that its use as the primary
standard is a violation of a larger and more important principle already
mentioned, that which demands the presence of a mens rea, or guilty
mind, for every criminal act.
Without seeking the justification of this principle, or undertaking
a thorough analysis of it (which it surely deserves), one can immediately
grasp its force. In every act which we call criminal there is the outward
manifestation, or deed, plus some inward or mental clement which makes
the deed wrongful. The mental element may have to be the specific intent
to commit that crime, or the intent to commit some other crime, or
merely sonic mental state, of negligence or recklessness, sufficient to establish
culpability. But in every case for the act to be a crime there must be some
mens rea. What will constitute a mens rea is a question of considerable
complexity. Some cognitive elements are surely involved: the accused
must have had at least a rough understanding of the circumstances of
his action, and the consequences of his action. Some degree of knowledge,
varying with the nature of the offense, must be present in order for a
mens rea to be entertained. But- and this is the core of the present
objection to the McNaghten rule- knowledge alone does not establish
a guilty mind. The accused must not only know what he is doing, or what
the circumstances and consequences of his act may be - he must also
do the act voluntarily. Now admittedly the concept of voluntary action is
not very clear; yet come such element does and must play an important
role in establishing criminal guilt. For only then is the act his act, and only
then will the courts hold him responsible for it. This distinction has been
36. GLUECic,

op cit, Tuora note 1, at 209.
37. See, Davies, Irresistible Impulse in English Law, 17 CAM. B. REv. 147, 165
(1939). For a detailed account of the widespread and exclusive acceptance of the right
and wrong test of criminal responsibility see GLUEcK, Op. cit. suo ra, note 1, at
227-231.
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made, with general applicability, by Aristotle and innumerable others;
in the law, from the time of Justinian it has been recognizcd, in some
form or other, that really insane persons should not be held answerable
because their mental condition makes voluntary actioni impossible.-" And
yet it is just this volitional clcment, essential to the establishment of a
genuine mens rea, which the McNaghten rule ignores - for it, and its
variants, look only or chiefly at the defendant's knowledge of the differences
between right and wrong. Whatever that may be, it cannot by itself be
enough for fix criminal responsibility?"
The inconsistency which thus results from the application of such
tests of responsibility becomes crassly apparent in the charges of some
judges to the jury. For in explaining the law it is not unusual to find the
general requirement of mens rea, or criminal intent, mentioned at the
outset of a judge's charge, only to find a later reliance upon the defendant's
knowledge of right and wrong alone, to establish his criminal responsibility.
But the consequences of mental disorder upon volition cannot be ignored.
Knowledge of right and wrong may be present where yet genuine criminal
intent could not be entertained, by virtue of insanity. The overemphasis
upon the cognitive aspects of mental life is thus not only erroneous from
the standpoint of psychology and psychiatry, but results in legal inconsistencies, and gross violation of very general and well established legal
principles.
VI
Underlying the inconsistencies, confusions, and other inadequacies of
this approach to criminal responsibility arc the ethical and epistemological
assumptions which the McNaghten rule is based upon - assumptions
which, though rarely even noticed, are questionable if not false. Naive
beliefs concerning the grounds of knowledge in moral affairs, conflicting
opinions concerning the nature of the ethically right and wrong, and
confusions with respect to the intended legal significance of these terms
-all
have contributed to a virtually unintelligible mass of opinions about
what the right and wrong test really means, and how it is supposed to
be applied. To see how philosophically confused these discussions have
become, one must begin with some general distinctions concerning the
concepts in question. But first consider once again the specific wording
of the classical McNaghten opinion:
To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
38. 3 AaISTOTI.P, NICOMACuEAN ETHICS Ch.
JUSTMiNAN, DIEST 50, 17, 40 (533).

1,

at

1109 b 30 (c. 322 B.C.);

39. For an account of instances in which mental disorders do not visibly affect
cognitive stability, and yet do cause conative instability see Barnes, supra note 18, at 312.
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he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part
of the question to the jury oi these occasions has generally been,
whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong.i 0
1.The first question, arising immediately, is whether the expected
knowledge of right and wrong is a general and abstract knowledge of these
matters, or the knowledge of right and wrong with respect to that same
act with which lie is charged. The judges who voiced the McNaghten
opinions were themselves conscious of this problem, and held that the
specific as opposed to the general application of the test is the more
accurate -and reliable standard of responsibility. However, although the
present usage of the right and wrong test frequently relies for wording
upon these classical opinions, this particular preference of the judges for
the specific application of the test has on many occasions been ignored."
As a practical matter, however, this ambiguity of the rule has not been a
serious handicap to its operatiop, since most jurisdictions do apply it
with reference to the particular act in question.
2. But if, to establish his non-responsibility, it must be shown that
the defendant did not know that his act was wrong, in what sense is the
term "wrong" in this context to be understood? Now this, it is obvious,
becomes a sticky business, and again several consequential ambiguities
must first be recognized. The first of these is the uncertainty as to the
legal or moral significance of "wrong" in the test proposed. Now some
criminologists have argued4 2 that this distinction is really not an important
one, because, so far as most serious anti-social acts are concerned, law and
morals are indistinguishable. It is indeed true that most serious offenses
are violations of both moral and legal codes; but the codes are nevertheless
distinguishable, and in this context the distinction is most important,
for here we are focusing not upon the objective character of the offense,
as immoral and/or illegal, but upon the state of the defendant's knowledge
concerning the character of that act. And it is perfectly possible for him
to have known that it is wrong in one of these senses, and not to have
known it was wrong in the other. An insane person may know intellectually,
for example, that a certain act is against the law, and yet have no
appreciation of its immoral character.43 Therefore the distinction between
legal and moral wrong, though its importance in some other contexts is
40. McNaghten's Case, I0C1. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
41. See Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 276 (1879).
42. E.g., GLOECK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 220.
43. It has been suggested that the mental disorder which results in the total
incapacity to appreciate the right and wrong of any act be called "anethopathy", lack
of ethical sense. Karpman, Criteria for Knowing Right from Wrong, 2 1. OF CRuIN.
PSYCHOPATfOLocv 376, 381 (1941). "In the sense that a mental defective lacks
intelligence, so does the psychopath (ancthopath) lack moral sense. It is as if it were
constitutionally lacking in him, and no amount of training can supply it. In this respect
he is not unlike the mental defective, perhaps even inferior to him."
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arguable, is surely a very important distinction with reference to the test
for responsibility.
And there has been a good deal of confusion on this matter in the
actual statements of the principle as judges have presented them. Some
of this confusion stems from the fact that in the McNraghten opinions
it was held both that "If the accused was conscious that the act was one
which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary
to the law of the land, he is punishable . . ."" (Emphasis added.) and,

in another answer that "he is nevertheless punishable according to the
nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such
crime that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand . . . the law of the land." 45 (Emphasis added.) From this source,

therefore, the wrong in question may be interpreted either as moral wrong
or as legal wrong. In fact the courts have interpreted the rule in both
ways, and some courts have required the knowledge that the act was
both morally and legally wrong. Even so fundamental a matter as this
has thus been a cause of considerable inconsistency in the application of
the tests for responsibility.
3. There are then three different demands which the McNaghten
test, or its variants, could be making. The sanity, and consequently the
responsibility of the accused will be established if:
(1) he knew the act was legally wrong, or
(2) lie knew the act was morally wrong, or
(3) he knew the act was legally and morally wrong.
Even if it were known which of these demands was being made, it can
be shown that it is virtually impossible to determine whether the defendant
had such knowledge. Furthermore, the lack of such knowledge (moral,
legal, or both) is exceedingly common even in the case of persons whose
sanity has never been called into question - which helps to show how
inadequate and inapplicable the McNaghten test is as a guide to the
determination of criminal responsibility. Consider these three possibilities
in somewhat more detail:
(1) Suppose it is the defendant's knowledge of legal wrongness which
we wish to ascertain. How then are we to go about doing so? We will
not be satisfied by simply asking him; nor can we, under the circumstances,
assume that his conduct is indicative of his knowledge. What is apparent
upon reflection is that, in a vast number of situations, a great number of
citizens would not know what is legally right and what is legally wrong.
Usually this is due to simple ignorance of the law, and this ignorance
is understandable in the light of the complexities and conflicts of our
44. The answer to the second and third questions, McNaghten's Case, CL. & Fin.
200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723 (1843).
45. Id. at 209, 8 Eng. Rep. I'he answer to the first question.
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legal system. Thcrefore, in most instances, the defendant is presumed
to know the law; but in this area, where knowledge is the very point at
issue, such a presumption may not be involved. And of course the right
and wrong tests give-no indication of just when or why such a presumption
should not be applied. The common ignorance of legal wrong, which
makes this presumption necessary, certainly bears no relation to the
state of one's mental health. In many cases the ignorance of what is
legally right and wrong is quite justifiable, as when a case is not clearly
covered by law, and has not yet been decided by the courts. If this kind
of ignorance of right and wrong were an indication of insanity, most of
the judges, and all of the lawyers would have to be committed to an
asylum.
-It may be objected that all this applies only to borderline cases,
where the issue of legal wrongness is truly in doubt, and that the possession
of such knowledge is only rarely questionable. To this, two replies may
be made:
(a) Often this is simply not the case. What is an obvious legal offense
for one, may not be such for another, particularly when there are great
differences in the environment, education, and mental ability of the persons
concerned.
(b) Even though crimes such as housebreaking and larceny seem to
be obviously against the law, it is often impossible to determine whether
knowledge of this illegality was had by a defendant of sub-normal intelligence, or whose mental condition is at least very questionable. In such
cases, what the subject did is often the best indication of what he knew
at the time. Now if we use the nature of his act in order to ascertain what
he actually knew, we cannot sensibly use his legal knowledge as a test for
the nature of his act and his responsibility. The strange result of such
a process would be that in many cases the commission of a crime would
produce its excuse. Clearly, this approach will lead us only in circles. Of
course this does not mean that we cannot inquire into the defendant's
sanity or responsibility; it does mean that we cannot properly use, as a
guide to the health of his mind, the state of his legal knowledge.
(2) In most instances, however, in which the knowledge of the
difference between right and wrong is used by the courts as the criterion
of responsibility, what is meant is a knowledge of the moral, not the legal
character of the act. One of the very ablest interpreters of our law, Justice
Cardozo, after carefully examining the genesis of this test, was very
strongly of this opinion. He argues that it is the answers to the second and
third questions of- the McNaghten opinions 40 in particular which have
formed our law on the subject, and that at that point the judges "expressly
held that a defendant who knew nothing of the law would nonetheless
46. Id. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. See also part III of text supra.
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be responsible if he knew that the act was wrong, by which, therefore,
they must have meant, if he knew that it was morally wrong." 47 Cardozo
continues:
But, whether lie would also be responsible if lie knew that it was
against the law, but did not know it to be morally wrong, is a
question that was not considered. In most cases, of course,
knowledge that an act is illegal would justify the inference of
knowledge that it is wrong. But none thc less it is the knowledge
of wrong, as conceived of as moral wrong, that seems to have
been established by that decision as the controlling test. That
must certainly have been the test under the older law when the
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong imported a
capacity to distinguish between good and evil as abstract qualities.
There is nothing to justify the belief that the words right andwrong, when they became limited by McNaghten's Case to the
right and wrong of the particular act, cast off their meanings
as terms of morals, and became terms of pure legality. 8
The inconsistency between the answer to the first and the answer
to the second and third of the MeNaghten questions is thus resolved by
Cardozo in two ways: first by the claim that, if the conflict is regarded
as serious, it is the latter -specifying knowledge of moral wrong as the
essential factor-which retains legal authority; second, by arguing that
"the conflict is more apparent than real," because "the answer to the
first question, though it seems to make the knowledge of the law a
test, presupposes the offender's capacity to understand that violation of
the law is wrong." In any event, the upshot of Cardozo's analysis, and
the facts of actual legal process both indicate that it is moral, not legal
wrong with which the McNaghten test and its variants are concerned.
But the problem of determining whether the defendant possessed
knowledge of the difference between moral right and wrong is clearly
enormous. Yet its difficulty, its complexity, is recognized, if at all, only
imperfectly in the courts. Assumptions about the nature of such knowledge
are acted upon with a confused understanding of certain important
distinctions which have been emphasized by ethical analysts from Aristotle
to the present day, and which have the most direct bearing upon these
legal issues.
(a) There is first the distinction to be made between an act wrong
(in the non-legal sense) because of purely factual ignorance or error on
the part of the actor (as when one does not know or is mistaken about
the actual circumstances or consequences of his act), and an act wrong
(in the non-legal sense) because of purely ethical ignorance or error on
the part of the actor (as when one does not know or is mistaken about
what is ethically right or wrong in a given situation.) This distinction
the legal process surely recognizes, but, unfortunately, applies in a faulty
47. People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
48. Id. at 333.
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manner. It is a general principle in law -to which, of course, there are
some exceptions -that. a bona fide and reasonable belief in the existence
of facts which, if they did exist, would render the act innocent, is a good
defense. In the case of the insane, this principle is extended to cover
delusive beliefs, which will excuse if, supposing them true, innocence
would be established. Now the general principle here is based upon the
assumption that while mistakes of fact are common and often unavoidable,
mistakes concerning what the law is will not excuse, for every person is
presumed, as it is said, to know the law. 40 The law, and the moral rule
which it represents, (as Aristotle might say, the major premise), every
man is supposed to know and obey. However, when the defendant's sanity
is in question, this is lust the supposition that cannot properly be made.
For, as we have already tried to show, 50 the factual beliefs of one whose
mental condition is disordered may be integrally related to his inability
to appreciate the force of the rule, or to govern his conduct voluntarily.
So the law here allows the use of the theoretical distinction between
mistake of fact and ethical mistake to obscure the realization that in
diseased minds the factual error brought on by delusion is only a symptom
of general disorder, and, perhaps, indicative of a non-responsible agent.
The inapplicability of this distinction in just this kind of case is thus overlooked by the McNaghten rule and its variants.
(b) But if the distinction between factual and ethical error is
overemphasized in the law, the further distinction between subjective and
objective right and wrong is virtually ignored. Out of context, the phrase
"knowledge of the difference between right and wrong" could refer to
the actor's realization of that difference from the standpoint of his own
personal ethical standards. But this the McNaghten test does not mean
by the phrase, since, understandably, the law is not interested in what
ethical views happen to be held by any defendant. And this points to the
underlying assumption of the application of this test: that there is some
set of objective moral standards, independent of individual preference or
circumstance, and open, at all times, to public inspection. Every adult,
it is assumed, who is not mentally disordered or deficient, is "old enough

to know right from wrong." Now there are several problems raised by such
an assumption.

(i) To begin with, while it is not being claimed here that such standards
do not exist, the question of their existence has been the source of prolonged
and profound philosophical dispute. There is little certainty that such objective right and wrong is nonsense; but certainly that such standards are publicly
available, if much more widespread, has little more indisputable support.
The only point here is that the objectivity of right and wrong is at least
open to question. And to that extent the knowledge of the difference
49. The few quasi-exceptional cases are not significant in this context. See CLARK &
MARSHALL, CRIMES 297 (6th ed. 1958).

50. See part IV of text supra.
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between the morally right and wrong is a most unsatisfactory test of
criminal responsibility, since, wherever the existence of moral standards of
just that kind is a matter of genuine doubt, this whole system of establishing
the responsibility of mentally disordered offenders will be viewed as
without foundation.
(ii) But supposing, as the law does, that such objective wrongness
does exist, there arc still the questions of deciding what it is, and how it
is to be discovered. We are not concerned here with discussing the answers
to these questions, or to propose an answer, but to point to the great
variety of such answers, and the great differences between them. Access to
objective wrong 'nay somehow be got by our understanding -but there
have been enormous disagreements not only about how it is got, but
as well about what it is, after we have got it. When speaking of the
knowledge of legal wrong as the index of sanity, we mentioned the
peculiar position in which that would place the lawyers and judges; now
if the index of sanity and responsibility is to be the knowledge of moral
right and wrong, how awkward is the position of the philosophers and
theologians - and indeed, of everyone who has been puzzled by fundamental
ethical questions!
Among normal people there are to be found a great many
different conceptions of right and wrong, of degrees of right and
wrong, as well as many different levels of conscience. Conscience,
as we know it is not anything fixed, but is exceedingly varied and
variable, having a great many nuances and variations, and recognizing many different types, degrees, and levels of right and
wrong.5

(iii) Going on to suppose, not only the existence of objective wrong,
but ahnost universal agreement upon its nature and its source

-

all of

which is very questionable - there is the further problem of deciding
whether the knowledge of such wrong was actually in the possession of
a defendant whose mental health is at issue. We do not mean to raise
the spinozistic question of an infinite regress - the successive problems
of having the knowledge, having the knowledge of the knowledge, and
having the knowledge of the knowledge of the knowledge, etc. But
because the original knowledge of the difference between right and wrong
is supposed to be an objective test of responsibility, the difficulties met
in ascertaining its existence must be recognized. For of course it is just
in those cases in which the presence of this knowledge is important - i.e.,
cases of alleged mental disorder - that the presumption of its possession
cannot be allowed. How then decide whether the accused in question
had this knowledge? Of what does such "knowledge" consist? Is it simply
acquaintance with certain moral rules? But then how determine such
acquaintance? And can "knowledge" be treated altogether as a matter
51. Karpman, sumjra note 43, at 376.
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independent of its application in practice? Or does the knowledge of
wrong perhaps entail the ability to subsume particular cases under general
rules? But if so, since the accused is allegedly disordered in mind, which
cases must he be able to subsume? And under which general rules?
And must one bc able to act upon such subsumptions for the knowledge
to be complete? To such questions there are no universally agreed upon
replies. And here we come to a criticism of this entire approach to
criminal responsibility which by itself would show the approach to be
unsatisfactory- namely, that the application of this test of responsibility
demands answers to questions for which there are no reliable answers.
One recent inquiry into this matter resulted in the following conclusion:
there is no developed scientific method of determining the
existence of such knowledge of the nature and quality or the
right and wrong as related to an act, or the lack of it. Nevertheless,
the law in effect compels answers to invalid questions of 'knowledge'
which cannot be met. 52
(3) It is hardly necessary to add that if the requirement of the
McNaghten Rule is interpreted to mean that a defendant's knowledge of
both legal and moral wrong is essential to establish his responsibility, all
of the objections which have been raised to each singly may then be
raised again.
4. All of these considerations lead to the final and most damaging
practical and theoretical objection to the right and wrong tests of criminal
responsibility: that, as one outstanding criminologist has put it, "it was
conceived in confusion, cradled iu confusion, and today, in its maturity,
is almost as confused as the most disordered defendants that are to be
tested under it."m That remark was made more than a quarter of a century
ago; yet in spite of the advances which have been made in the psychological
and legal sciences since that time, the confused state of the law on the
responsibility of the insane has improved hardly at all. "Normally, law
does not stand still"; one writer remarks, "it develops with national growth,
and the increase of scientific knowledge: in the defence of insanity the
McNaghten rules may be an exception."5 4 The point here is that the
McNaghten rule is not what it is intended to be; the questions asked
and answered in McNaghten's case arose because of the need for a clear
and definite test or rule. But clarity and definiteness are two qualities
which, surely, the right and wrong test does not possess. The result has
been not only the unjust disposition of particular cases, but the breakdown
in this area of that regularity and stability which is of the very essence
of justice under law.
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Vii
No one who has wrestled with the problem of developing a standard
for the determination of the legal responsibility of the mentally disordered
can fail to appreciate how difficult it is to provide an adequate replacement
for the NcNaghten rule. Each of the many suggestions which have been
made - ranging on the one hand from the placement of the decision
on the responsibility of the defendant in the hands of medical men instead
of courts or juries1 to, on the other hand, the abrogation of all rules or
tests, allowing the jury simply to make their decision on the responsibility
of the accused as best they can on the evidence presented" - each of these
has grave faults and much to be said in its favor. The long and difficult
struggle with this problem is probably evidence enough that there is no
simple rule or formula that will resolve the many difficulties which mental
disorder presents to the juridical process. This is just one more field in
which the concepts of legal responsibility must be worked out carefully
and arduously, in the light of the best knowledge that medical science can
provide, the best advice that moral philosophy can offer, and the practical
conditions and circumstances presented by the criminal law.
Because psychiatry is not yet a perfectly exact science; because there
are so many intermediate cases between the completly insane on the
one hand and the perfectly sane (if any) on the other; and above all
because the philosophical problems of responsibility are puzzling, and
perhaps perpetually so - for all of these reasons and more, the line drawn
between the legally responsible and the legally nonrcsponsible must be
somewhat arbitrary.
Vhatever the difficulties may be in drawing this line, however, they
do not justify the continued use of a test or standard of criminal responsibility
which is crude, obsolete, impractical, and unjust. For, as it has been shown
here at length, confusion, mistake, inconsistency and injustice arc the natural
consequences of approaching the problem of the responsibility of the
mentally disordered by asking about the defendant's knowledge of the
difference between right and wrong.

55. See CLrEcK, o. cit. sulra note 1, at 449.
56. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); 45 A.L.R.2d.
1430 (1954).

